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GENERICIDE: CANCELLATION OF A REGISTERED
TRADEMARK
INTRODUCTION
The purpose of a trademark is to indicate to the public that goods
come from a particular source.' The use of trademarks is regulated by
the Lanham Act (Act).2 Congress created the Act in order to protect a
trademark owner in his use of a particular mark and to prevent public
confusion concerning the source of goods. 3 Registration of a mark
1. Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 412-13 (1916). A trade-
mark is defined by federal statute as "any word, name, symbol, or device or any
combination thereof adopted and used by a manufacturer or merchant to identify his
goods and distinguish them from those manufactured or sold by others." 15 U.S.C. §
1127 (1976). Judge Learned Hand wrote that a manufacturer's trademark "is his
authentic seal; by it he vouches for the goods which bear it; it carries his name for
good or ill .... [A] reputation, like a face, is the symbol of its possessor and creator,
and another can use it only as a mask." Yale Elecs. Corp. v. Robertson, 26 F.2d 972,
974 (2d Cir. 1928). As one court stated, "[a] trade-mark is a trade-mark because it is
indicative of the origin of the goods." G.&C. Merriam Co. v. Saalfield, 198 F. 369,
372 (6th Cir. 1912), affd in part, 238 F. 1 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 243 U.S. 651
(1917).
Trademarks have been used for hundreds of years. They were developed in order
to trace responsibility for shoddy workmanship. Rogers, The Lanham Act and the
Social Function of Trade-marks, 14 Law and Contemp. Probs. 173, 173-74 (1949).
For a comprehensive discussion of trademark law, see generally L. Amdur, Trade-
Mark Law and Practice (Lanham Act ed. 1948); 3 R. Callmann, the Law of Unfair
Competition, Trademarks and Monopolies (3d ed. 1969 & Supp. 1982); 1 J. Mc-
Carthy, Trademarks and Unfair Competition (1973); E. Vandenburgh, Trademark
Law and Procedure (2d ed. 1968).
2. Pub. L. No. 79-489, 60 Stat. 427 (1946) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§
1051-1127 (1976)). Federal registration of a trademark serves as notice to the public
of an ownership claim. Id. § 1072. The trademark owner is granted exclusive use of
his mark, id. § 1057(b), so that all others are prohibited from affixing that mark to
similar goods. Id. § 1114(1). Four categories of marks have been recognized for
determining whether registration of a term is appropriate: 1) arbitrary (a common
term, used in an unfamiliar manner); 2) fanciful (a newly created or coined term),
or suggestive (a term requiring imagination to link it to the trademarked goods); 3)
descriptive (a mark that describes a quality or characteristic of the trademarked
product and will be registered only if the term has acquired a secondary meaning, so
that the public associates the term with the producer); and 4) generic (a term that is
the common name for a type of goods, is part of the general vernacular and which
will not be registered as a trademark). See, e.g., Surgicenters of Am., Inc. v. Medical
Dental Surgeries, Co., 601 F.2d 1011, 1014-15 (9th Cir. 1979); McGregor-Doniger
Inc. v. Drizzle Inc., 599 F.2d 1126, 1131-32 (2d Cir. 1979); Educational Dev. Corp.
v. Economy Co., 562 F.2d 26, 28 (10th Cir. 1977); Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v.
Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9-11 (2d Cir. 1976); Nabisco Brands, Inc. v.
Quaker Oats Co., 547 F. Supp. 692, 697-98 (D.N.J. 1982); Discount Muffler Shop,
Inc. v. Meineke Realty Corp., 535 F. Supp. 439, 444-45 (N.D. Ohio 1982); Nature's
Bounty, Inc. v. Superx Drugs Corp., 490 F. Supp. 50, 53 (E.D.N.Y. 1980).
3. S. Rep. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in 1946 U.S. Code Cong.
Serv. 1274, 1274.
GENERICIDE: CANCELLING A TRADEMARK
creates a presumption that it is valid;4 however, the Act provides that
a registered mark may be cancelled if it has become the "common
descriptive name" for a product.5 In other words, a mark may be
cancelled if it has lost its trademark significance and become generic. 6
A generic term, such as the word "car," designates a type or class of
goods, rather than indicating that the product comes from a single
source.
7
The traditional standard for determining genericness is based on
how the public perceives the contested mark 8-whether consumers
understand the mark to mean only a type of product, or whether they
recognize the name as being source indicative.9 A new standard,
4. 15 U.S.C. § 1057(b) (1976); e.g.,Coca-Cola Co. v. Overland, Inc., 692 F.2d
1250, 1254 (9th Cir. 1982); Playboy Enters. v. Chuckleberry Publishing Inc., 687
F.2d 563, 567 (2d Cir. 1982); American Home Prods. Corp. v. Johnson Chem. Co.,
589 F.2d 103, 106 (2d Cir. 1978); Venetianaire Corp. of Am. v. A & P Import Co.,
429 F.2d 1079, 1080 n.1 (2d Cir. 1970); Miss Universe, Inc. v. Patricelli, 408 F.2d
506, 509 (2d Cir. 1969); Aluminum Fabricating Co. v. Season-All Window Corp.,
259 F.2d 314, 316 (2d Cir. 1958); Trak Inc. v. Ski-Trac, Inc., 209 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
507, 510 (N.D. Cal. 1980).
5. 15 U.S.C. § 1064(c) (1976). Although this section provides that cancellation
may be granted on several grounds, this Note addresses only the issue of genericness,
and all references to cancellation concern cancellation based on a finding that a mark
is the common descriptive name for a product.
6. "A 'generic' term 'conveys information with respect to the nature or class of
an article,' while a trademark identifies the source of a particular product or article."
E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Yoshida Int'l, Inc., 393 F. Supp. 502, 523 n.43
(E.D.N.Y. 1975) (quoting 3 R. Callmann, supra note 1, § 70.4, at 111); see
Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976);
King-Seeley Thermos Co. v. Aladdin Indus., 321 F.2d 577, 579 (2d Cir. 1963);
Discount Muffler Shop, Inc. v. Meineke Realty Corp., 535 F. Supp. 439, 444 (N.D.
Ohio 1982); Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co., 272 F. 505, 509 (S.D.N.Y. 1921).
7. Carcione v. Greengrocer, Inc., 205 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1075, 1077 (E.D. Cal.
1979) ("If the primary significance of the term in the minds of the consuming public
is that the term refers to the producer and not to the general class of goods or services,
then the term is not generic."); accord Surgicenters of Am., Inc. v. Medical Dental
Surgeries, Co., 601 F.2d 1011, 1016 (9th Cir. 1979).
8. The public perception test has been consistently applied in cancellation cases.
See, e.g., Feathercombs, Inc. v. Solo Prods. Corp., 306 F.2d 251, 256 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 371 U.S. 910 (1962); Ross-Whitney Corp. v. Smith Kline & French Labs.,
207 F.2d 190, 194-95 (9th Cir. 1953); DuPont Cellophane Co. v. Waxed Prods. Co.,
85 F.2d 75, 81 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 299 U.S. 601 (1936); Dictaphone Corp. v.
Dictamatic Corp., 199 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 437, 445 (D. Or. 1978); E. I. DuPont de
Nemours & Co. v. Yoshida Int'l, Inc., 393 F. Supp. 502, 523 (E.D.N.Y. 1975); Stix
Prods., Inc. v. United Merchants & Mfrs., 295 F. Supp. 479, 490 (S.D.N.Y. 1968);
Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co., 272 F. 505, 509 (S.D.N.Y. 1921); 3 R. Callmann,
supra note 1, § 74.2, at 237; 1 J. McCarthy, supra note 1, § 12:2(A), at 406-07.
9. DuPont Cellophane Co. v. Waxed Prods. Co., 85 F.2d 75, 77 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 299 U.S. 601 (1936); Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co., 272 F. 505, 509
(S.D.N.Y. 1921); R. Guastavino Co. v. Comerma, 180 F. 920, 921 (C.C.S.D.N.Y.
1910); L. Amdur, supra note 1, at 310-12.
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however, was recently established by the Ninth Circuit in Anti-Mo-
nopoly, Inc. v. General Mills Fun Group, Inc., 10 which examines
purchasers' motivation for buying trademarked goods in order to
determine whether those goods constitute their own product category
(genus)." Under this standard, if a court finds that the trademarked
goods constitute a distinct genus, the relevant mark would be the
generic name for that category of goods, its registration would be
subject to cancellation, and its use available to everyone. 12
The Anti-Monopoly case raises the dual question of what standard
should be applied in determining whether a registered trademark has
become generic, and what burden of proof must be met to satisfy the
appropriate standard. This Note concludes that public perception is
the correct standard and proposes a set of factors to be considered in
determining how the public perceives the contested mark. The Note
further contends that the policy concerns of the Act mandate placing a
heavy burden of proof on the party that is challenging a trademark's
validity.
I. THE PROPER TEST: PUBLIC MOTIVATION OR PUBLIC PERcEPTION?
A. Defining the Tests
Although the Act does not set forth a standard for determining
whether a registered mark has become generic, Judge Learned Hand
established such a test in the early 1900's: "The single question... is
merely one of fact: What do the buyers understand by the word for
whose use the parties are contending?"' 13 This standard, the public
perception test, has consistently been applied in cancellation proceed-
ings. 14 It is the correct standard to apply because it focuses on the
ultimate purpose of a trademark-to denote that marked goods have
been produced by a single manufacturer-and evaluates whether
consumers understand that the mark indicates one manufacturer's
goods. 15 An evaluation of public understanding serves the Act's basic
10. 684 F.2d 1316 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 51 U.S.L.W. 3613 (U.S. Feb.
22, 1983).
11. Id. at 1324-25. For the appellate court's first decision in this case, see Anti-
Monopoly, Inc. v. General Mills Fun Group, Inc., 611 F.2d 296, 302-04 (9th Cir.
1979).
12. 611 F.2d at 302-03.
13. Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co., 272 F. 505, 509 (S.D.N.Y. 1921).
14. See supra note 8.
15. See, e.g., McGregor-Doniger Inc. v. Drizzle Inc., 599 F.2d 1126, 1131 (2d
Cir. 1979); United States Jaycees v. San Francisco Junior Chamber of Commerce,
513 F.2d 1226, 1226 (9th Cir. 1975) (Ely, J., concurring); King-Seeley Thermos Co.
v. Aladdin Indus., 321 F.2d 577, 580 (2d Cir. 1963); Blisscraft of Hollywood v.
United Plastics Co., 294 F.2d 694, 699-701 (2d Cir. 1961); Independent Nail &
Packing Co. v. Stronghold Screw Prods., Inc., 205 F.2d 921, 925-26 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 346 U.S. 886 (1953); Le Blume Import Co. v. Coty, 293 F. 344, 353-58 (2d
Cir. 1923); Nabisco Brands, Inc. v. Quaker Oats Co., 547 F. Supp. 692, 698 (D.N.J.
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objectives of protecting valid trademarks and preventing public con-
fusion concerning the origin of goods.' 6 If consumers recognize the
trademark as a brand name, they will not be confused concerning the
goods' origin. Thus, because the term is fulfilling the proper function
of a trademark, it should be afforded the full protection of the law.
In Anti-Monopoly, however, the Ninth Circuit established a differ-
ent standard for determining whether a registered mark has become
generic.17 The court's analysis focused on an evaluation of whether the
relevant trademarked goods constitute an entire genus, or merely a
species.' 8 A genus is a broad category or class of goods (laundry soap,
for example), whereas a species is one of many similar products mak-
ing up a larger category of goods 19 ("Tide" is a species of laundry
soap). Under the Ninth Circuit standard, a term may be generic even
though the public recognizes the contested term as a brand name,
which is source indicative, if the court finds that the trademarked
goods constitute their own genus.2 0 This determination is made by
evaluating why consumers purchase the trademarked goods.21 The
court reasoned that consumers' motivation for buying the relevant
goods would indicate whether the product is unique, or so different
from other manufacturers' products that it should be considered to be
its own genus. 22
The court employed a two-part public opinion survey designed to
ascertain public motivation in purchasing the trademarked goods,
Parker Brothers' real estate trading board game, "Monopoly." Con-
sumers were first asked simply to state their reasons for purchasing the
1982); Loctite Corp. v. National Starch & Chem. Corp., 516 F. Supp. 190, 199
(S.D.N.Y. 1981).
16. S. Rep. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in 1946 U.S. Code Cong.
Serv. 1274; accord Scott Paper Co. v. Scott's Liquid Gold, Inc., 589 F.2d 1225, 1228
(3d Cir. 1978); Smith v. Chanel, Inc., 402 F.2d 562, 566 (9th Cir. 1968); Maier
Brewing Co. v. Fleischmann Distilling Corp., 390 F.2d 117, 122-23 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 391 U.S. 966 (1968); In re DC Comics, Inc., 689 F.2d 1042, 1053 (C.C.P.A.
1982) (Nies, J., specially concurring); In re National Distillers & Chem. Corp., 297
F.2d 941, 951-53 (C.C.P.A. 1962) (Rich, J., concurring); D. Robert, The New
Trade-Mark Manual xx-xxi (1947).
17. See 684 F.2d at 1324-25.
18. See id. at 1324; Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. General Mills Fun Group, Inc., 611
F.2d 296, 302-04 (9th Cir. 1979). The Ninth Circuit reasoned that a product can
change from being a species into being a genus if "a product's popularity is such that
its mark is no longer primarily source-identifying, the product itself, though origi-
nally a species of another generic class, 'becomes its own genus' and its name is then
deemed generic." 3 R. Callmann, supra note 1, § 74.5, at 88 (Supp. 1982).
19. See Surgicenters of Am., Inc. v. Medical Dental Surgeries Co., 601 F.2d
1011, 1014 (9th Cir. 1979); Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537
F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976).
20. See 684 F.2d at 1322-24.
21. Id. at 1324-25.
22. 611 F.2d at 302-04.
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trademarked goods.23 Reasons relating to the product itself were con-
sidered an indication that the product constituted a genus. 24 Examples
of such reasons included that the game was interesting, educational,
fun or a family game.25 Durability, price and quality were classified
as source-related reasons indicating that "Monopoly" is only a spe-
cies. 26
The second part of the test involved asking those interviewed which
of the following statements best expressed their reasons for buying the
trademarked goods: "I would like Parker Brothers' 'Monopoly' game
primarily because I like Parker Brothers' products"-an indication
that the consumers are buying for source-related reasons; or "I want a
'Monopoly' game primarily because I am interested in playing 'Mo-
nopoly,' I don't much care who makes it"-a product-related rea-
son.
27
The Court of Customs and Patents Appeals recently rejected the
idea that a unique product should be deemed to constitute a new
product category and therefore be denied the exclusive use of its
trademark name.28 The special concurring opinion specifically re-
jected the purchaser motivation test, stating that the public's reasons
for buying products are "legally immaterial" in determining whether
a mark is generic, and that such a determination should not depend
upon how broadly or narrowly the court defines the genus of goods.29
Similarly, in Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co., 30 the landmark case in
which Judge Learned Hand set forth the public perception test, the
court noted that a trademark's validity should not rigidly depend
23. 684 F.2d at 1324.
24. See id. at 1324-25.
25. Id. at 1324.
26. 611 F.2d at 303.
27. 684 F.2d at 1324.
28. In re DC Comics, Inc., 689 F.2d 1042, 1045 (C.C.P.A. 1982). In SK & F Co.
v. Premo Pharmaceutical Labs., Inc., 481 F. Supp. 1184, 1188 (D.N.J. 1979), aff'd,
625 F.2d 1055 (3d Cir. 1980), the district court afforded protection to the contested
trademark (the trade dress of the goods) based on the fact that the product was
unique and no similar product existed on the market.
29. In re DC Comics, Inc., 689 F.2d 1042, 1054 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (Nies, J.,
specially concurring); accord 1 J. McCarthy, supra note 1, § 12:6, at 417 ("[T]he
problem of defining a genus of products is merely a secondary test to the ultimate
question: What do buyers think the word means?").
The district court in Anti-Monopoly also rejected the motivation survey, stating
that the dispositive issue was not why the public buys "Monopoly" sets, but rather
what they understand the term "Monopoly" to mean. Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. Gen-
eral Mills Fun Group, Inc., 515 F. Supp. 448, 454 (N.D. Cal. 1981), rev'd, 684 F.2d
1316 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 51 U.S.L.W. 3613 (U.S. Feb. 22, 1983). Based on
the cumulative weight of the evidence, the district court found that the term "Mo-
nopoly" was not generic. Id. The appellate court reversed that finding as being
"clearly erroneous." 684 F.2d at 1322-26.
30. 272 F. 505 (S.D.N.Y. 1921).
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upon differentiating between goods that constitute a genus and those
that constitute a species. 3 '
B. The Aftermath of Anti-Monopoly
Even the strongest trademarks are threatened by the purchaser
motivation test.32 Two surveys concerning the trademark "Tide"
clearly illustrate this concern. In one survey, 89% of those inter-
viewed recognized "Tide" as a brand name. 33 Under the public per-
ception test, "Tide" would be considered a very strong trademark
because it clearly denotes source to the public. In a survey based on
the purchaser motivation test, however, more than two-thirds of those
interviewed gave product-related reasons for purchasing "Tide";34
therefore, "Tide" would constitute its own genus and be subject to
cancellation as being generic. In response to the "Tide" survey, the
court in Anti-Monopoly stated:
[The] results tend to show that the general public regards "Tide" as
the name of a particular detergent, having particular qualities,
rather than as one producer's brand name for the same detergent
which is available from a variety of sources .... If the general
public does think this . .. Proctor and Gamble might have cause
for alarm.3 5
Many trademarks would be threatened if unique products, or trade-
marked goods that are substantially different from other manufactur-
ers' goods, are classified as being a genus unto themselves.36 Manufac-
31. Id. at 513.
32. See Petition for Certiorari, CPG Prods. v. Anti-Monopoly, Inc., No. 82-1075
(U.S. Dec. 23, 1982), reprinted in 25 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) 189, 189
(1983); 3 R. Callmann, supra note 1, at § 74.5, at 90 (Supp. 1982).
33. Brief for Parker Brothers as Defendant, Counterclaimant and Appellee at 15,
Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. General Mills Fun Group, Inc., 684 F.2d 1316 (9th Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 51 U.S.L.W. 3613 (U.S. Feb. 22, 1983).
34. Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. General Mills Fun Group, Inc., 684 F.2d 1316, 1326
(9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 51 U.S.L.W. 3613 (U.S. Feb. 22, 1983).
35. Id.
36. See Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. General Mills Fun Group, Inc., 611 F.2d 296,
303 (9th Cir. 1979). In E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc. v. Cooper Labs., Inc., 536 F. Supp.
523 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), the district court applied the genus/species test and found that
the plaintiffs trademark "Angle" was generic. It concluded that the term "Angle"
designates a category or genus of goods: all toothbrushes with bent handles. Id. at
528. The court focused on defining the genus, rather than examining public percep-
tion of the contested mark and noted that "little direct evidence of the public's
understanding of the term was presented." Id. The court also noted that if the
trademark owner were permitted to retain exclusive use of the term as a trademark,
competitors would still be able to describe products that were similar to the trade-
marked product. Id. See infra pt. II(A) for a discussion of the need for alternative
terms.
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turers generally promote their goods based on the products' unique
qualities. 37 Many manufacturers spend fortunes publicizing their
goods with the idea that if the public associates the trademark with a
desirable characteristic of the product, such as quality or social status,
consumers will be persuaded to buy the trademarked goods.38 Pro-
ducers often emphasize that their goods differ from other manufactur-
ers' goods by advertising a special taste, an unsurpassed cleaning
power, a secret recipe or an unusually challenging game.39 Who is to
say which product qualities may safely be promoted without causing
the trademarked goods to be classified as a genus and which may not?
The purchaser motivation test attempts to establish precisely such a
delineation.
An analogy may be made to antitrust law by applying the rationale
set forth by the Supreme Court:
A retail seller may have in one sense a monopoly on certain trade
because . . . no one else makes a product of just the quality or
attractiveness of his product, as for example in cigarettes. Thus one
can theorize that we have monopolistic competition in every non-
standardized commodity with each manufacturer having power
over the price and production of his own product. However, this
power that, let us say, automobile or soft-drink manufacturers
have over their trademarked products is not the power that makes
an illegal monopoly .... [T]here are certain differences in the
formulae for soft drinks but one can hardly say that each one is an
illegal monopoly. 40
Although products differ from one another, it can hardly be said that
such differences create entirely new categories of goods, requiring
denial of trademark rights.4 '
Under the purchaser motivation standard, a product constitutes its
own genus if consumers indicate that they are interested in buying the
product, but do not care who makes it. 42 This implies that consumers
37. In re DC Comics, Inc., 689 F.2d 1042, 1053-54 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (Nies, J.,
specially concurring); see Truck Equip. Serv. Co. v. Fruehauf Corp., 536 F.2d 1210,
1223 (8th Cir.) (the uniqueness of the product's design entitled the product to
trademark protection), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 861 (1976).
38. Maier Brewing Co. v. Fleischmann Distilling Corp., 390 F.2d 117, 122 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 966 (1968).
39. In re DC Comics, Inc., 689 F.2d 1042, 1053-54 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (Nies, J.,
specially concurring).
40. United States v. E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 392-93
(1956) (footnotes omitted).
41. In re DC Comics, Inc., 689 F.2d 1042, 1045 (C.C.P.A. 1982) ("[A]ppellant
cannot be considered to have created a new product category, the rubric of
which... should remain available for all to employ in commerce, simply by having
originated and promoted ... [a] unique [product].").
42. See Anti-Monopoly Inc. v. General Mills Fun Group, 684 F.2d 1316, 1324
(9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 51 U.S.L.W. 3613 (U.S. Feb. 22, 1983).
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must know the identity of the producer for a trademark to be valid. 43
An individual, however, is generally unaware of who makes the
trademarked goods,44 and usually a person's primary objective is to
buy particular goods and not to seek out a particular producer per
se. 45 Trademark law has traditionally afforded protection to marks
that indicate source, even though the source is anonymous. 46 The
value of a trademark is that it permits consumers to be confident that
they are getting the goods they have asked for and want to receive.4 7
The trademark becomes the manufacturer's symbol in place of his
name 48 so that purchasers need not know the identity of the manufac-
turer; rather, they need only know that a trademark identifies the
excellence of his work. 49
C. Legislative Policies
Both the public perception test and the concept that a mark may be
valid even though the producer is anonymous were set forth more
than twenty years before the Act was adopted.5 0 In passing the Act,
Congress intended to remedy certain judicial interpretations of the
trademark law that existed at that time.5' It did not establish an
alternative test for determining genericness, nor did it indicate that a
producer's name need be known by the public as a prerequisite to
trademark validity.
43. See 3 R. Callmann, supra note 1, § 74.5, at 89-90 (Supp. 1982).
44. E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Yoshida Int'l, Inc., 393 F. Supp. 502, 512
& n.8 (E.D.N.Y. 1975); 3 R. Callmann, supra note 1, § 82.2(a), at 774; id. § 84.1, at
935.
45. In re DC Comics, Inc., 689 F.2d 1042, 1054 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (Nies, J.,
specially concurring).
46. See, e.g., McGregor-Doniger Inc. v. Drizzle Inc., 599 F.2d 1126, 1131 (2d
Cir. 1979); Union Carbide Corp. v. Ever-Ready Inc., 531 F.2d 366, 381 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 830 (1976); Feathercombs, Inc. v. Solo Prods. Corp., 306 F.2d
251, 255 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 910 (1962); Tas-T-Nut Co. v. Variety Nut
& Date Co., 245 F.2d 3, 7 (6th Cir. 1957); Crescent Tool Co. v. Kilborn & Bishop
Co., 247 F. 299, 300 (2d Cir. 1917); National Football League Properties, Inc. v.
Wichita Falls Sportswear, Inc., 532 F. Supp. 651, 658-59 (W.D. Wash. 1982); E. I.
DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Yoshida Int'l, Inc., 393 F. Supp. 502, 512 (E.D.N.Y.
1975); Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co., 272 F. 505, 509 (S.D.N.Y. 1921); 3 R.
Callmann, supra note 1, § 74.2, at 235-36.
47. S. Rep. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in 1946 U.S. Code Cong.
Serv. 1274, 1274; accord In re National Distillers & Chem. Corp., 297 F.2d 941, 952
(C.C.P.A. 1962)(Rich, J., concurring); D. Robert, supra note 16, Introduction at xxi.
48. Yale Elecs. Corp. v. Robertson, 26 F.2d 972, 974 (2d Cir. 1928).
49. See R. Guastavino Co. v. Comerma, 184 F. 549, 550 (S.D.N.Y. 1911).
50. See Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co., 272 F. 505, 509 (S.D.N.Y. 1921).
51. S. Rep. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in 1946 U.S. Code Cong.
Serv. 1274, 1276.
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Disregarding public understanding of a mark runs counter to the
basic teachings of trademark law5 2 and loses sight of the underlying
goals of the Act. 53 A determination of whether a registered mark has
become generic should be based on public perception of the contested
term, rather than on public motivation for purchasing the trade-
marked goods.
II. PROPOSED FACTORS FOR DErERMINING GENERICNESS
Public understanding of a mark is an amorphous concept 5 4 for
which no single definitive evidentiary factor exists. Moreover, courts
have failed to establish a standard set of factors to be examined in
evaluating public perception. Evaluating the validity of a mark based
on a cohesive group of factors would further the goals of the Act by
ensuring consistency in the application of trademark law. 5 Such fac-
tors should include: 1) availability of alternative terms; 2) likelihood
of confusion; 3) public opinion surveys; 4) secondary meaning; 5)
advertising and sales; and 6) manner and length of use. These factors
have all been used at different times in cancellation or trademark
infringement cases and should be considered as a group whenever a
trademark is challenged as generic.
A. The Availability of Alternative Terms
A primary consideration in cancellation proceedings is whether
there are terms, other than the contested mark, that can be used to
accurately describe the relevant goods.5 This factor should be given
52. DuPont Cellophane Co. v. Waxed Prods. Co., 85 F.2d 75, 81 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 299 U.S. 601 (1936); accord 3 R. Callmann, supra note 1, § 74.2, at 237.
53. See In re DC Comics, Inc., 689 F.2d 1042, 1053 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (Nies, J.,
specially concurring).
54. See McGregor-Doniger Inc. v. Drizzle Inc., 599 F.2d 1126, 1133 (2d Cir.
1979); Del Labs., Inc. v. Alleghany Pharmacal Corp., 516 F. Supp. 777, 781
(S.D.N.Y. 1981); E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Yoshida Int'l, Inc., 393 F.
Supp. 502, 512 (E.D.N.Y. 1975); 3 R. Callmann, supra note 1, § 82.1(1), at 757; see
also HMH Publishing Co. v. Brincat, 504 F.2d 713, 716 (9th Cir. 1974)("[D]octrinal
confusion, conflicting results, and judicial prolixity" are the "hallmarks" of trade-
mark infringement cases, which also involve an examination of whether the public
associates a trademark with a single source.).
55. See S. Rep. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in 1946 U.S. Code
Cong. Serv. 1274, 1274.
56. See, e.g., Donald F. Duncan, Inc. v. Royal Tops Mfg. Co., 343 F.2d 655,
663 (7th Cir. 1965); Ross-Whitney Corp. v. Smith Kline & French Labs., 207 F.2d
190, 195 (9th Cir. 1953); DuPont Cellophane Co. v. Waxed Prods. Co., 85 F.2d 75,
79-80 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 299 U.S. 601 (1936); Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co.,
272 F. 505, 510-11 (S.D.N.Y. 1921); Dictaphone Corp. v. Dictamatic Corp., 199
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 437, 445 (D. Or. 1978).
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considerable weight in determining whether a term is generic because
the doctrine of genericness is based on the concept that manufacturers
and consumers should be able to describe goods that are similar or
identical to the trademarked goods.5 7 If the public knows the product
by only one description, no individual will be granted the exclusive
use of that name.5 8
The term "aspirin," for example, had been used generically by the
producer and the public for more than a decade 59 and was found to be
generic because it had become the only name by which the public
knew that particular kind of drug.60 The only alternative description
available to competitors marketing the same product was "acetyl
salicylic acid," a complicated term with which the public was unfa-
miliar.61
Granting exclusive use of a term that is the only publicly recogniz-
able name for a category of goods unfairly limits competition 62 be-
cause it confers a monopoly on the trademark owner by rendering
competitors unable to describe their goods effectively.6 3 Competitors
are hampered in the sale of their goods, and consumers cannot easily
discover whether products similar to the trademarked goods are avail-
able from other sources. If adequate synonyms are available, how-
ever, permitting a trademark owner to retain exclusive rights in a
mark does not handicap competitors or consumers.6 4 Widespread use
of alternative terms may prove that competitors do not need the
contested mark to describe their goods.65 Moreover, trademark protec-
57. See Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 10 (2d
Cir. 1976); Bada Co. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 426 F.2d 8, 11 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 916 (1970); National Football League Properties, Inc. v. Wichita
Falls Sportswear, Inc., 532 F. Supp. 651, 663 (W.D. Wash. 1982); Del Labs., Inc. v.
Alleghany Pharmacal Corp., 516 F. Supp. 777, 780 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (quoting
Reese Publishing Co. v. Hampton Int'l Communications, Inc., 620 F.2d 7, 10 (2d
Cir. 1980)); L. Amdur, supra note 1, at 310.
58. L. Amdur, supra note 1, at 310; see Dictaphone Corp. v. Dictamatic Corp.,
199 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 437, 445 (D. Or. 1978); 1 J. McCarthy, supra note 1, § 12:2(F),
at 409-10.
59. Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co., 272 F. 505, 510-12 (S.D.N.Y. 1921).
60. Id.
61. Id. at 511.
62. Smith v. Chanel, Inc., 402 F.2d 562, 566-69 (9th Cir. 1968).
63. Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 10 (2d Cir.
1976); CES Publishing Corp. v. St. Regis Publications, Inc., 531 F.2d 11, 13 (2d Cir.
1975).
64. L. Amdur, supra note 1, at 310.
65. Dictaphone Corp. v. Dictamatic Corp., 199 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 437, 447 (D.
Or. 1978); see Stix Prods., Inc. v. United Merchants & Mfrs., Inc., 295 F. Supp. 479,
483-84 (S.D.N.Y. 1968)(contested term was found valid; alternative descriptions had
been used by competitors for many years to describe similar products); Q-Tips, Inc.
v. Johnson & Johnson, 108 F. Supp. 845, 863 (D.N.J. 1952)(same), affd, 206 F.2d
144 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 867 (1953).
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tion may be afforded to the contested mark even though existing
synonyms are not generally used.6 6 Along the same lines, consideration
should be given to whether use of the contested trademark is necessary
to describe certain goods or whether a challenging party simply hopes
to reap the benefits of the owner's advertising and goodwill. Whether
a competitor is "riding the coattails" of the trademark owner 7 is
frequently a factor in trademark infringement cases.68
A valid trademark does not, by itself, constitute a restraint of
trade.69 When the Act was passed, Congress specifically stated that
trademark protection does not foster monopolies.70 Moreover, as
noted by one court, "it is significant that in almost every reported
instance where the antitrust misuse of a trademark has been raised as
a defense, it has been rejected."' 71 Trademark protection bars competi-
66. See E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Yoshida Int'l, Inc., 393 F. Supp. 502,
526 (E.D.N.Y. 1975).
67. Stork Restaurant, Inc. v. Sahati, 166 F.2d 348, 356-57 (9th Cir. 1948).
68. See, e.g., Spring Mills, Inc. v. Ultracashmere House, Ltd., 689 F.2d 1127,
1134 (2d Cir. 1982); James Burrough Ltd. v. Sign of Beefeater, Inc., 540 F.2d 266,
277 (7th Cir. 1976); Maier Brewing Co. v. Fleischmann Distilling Corp., 390 F.2d
117, 122 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 966 (1968); Stork Restaurant, Inc. v.
Sahati, 166 F.2d 348, 356-57 (9th Cir. 1948); SK & F Co. v. Premo Pharmaceutical
Labs., Inc., 481 F. Supp. 1184, 1190 (D.N.J. 1979), aff'd, 625 F.2d 1055 (3d Cir.
1980).
Interestingly, in Anti-Monopoly the plaintiff first marketed his game under the
name "Bust the Trust" with unsuccessful results. After changing the name to "Anti-
Monopoly," the plaintiff sold more than 400,000 games, making almost a million
dollars. Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. General Mills Fun Group, Inc., 195 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
634, 636-37 (N.D. Cal. 1977), rev'd and remanded, 611 F.2d 296 (9th Cir. 1979), on
remand, 515 F. Supp. 448 (N.D. Cal. 1981), rev'd, 684 F.2d 1316 (9th Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 51 U.S.L.W. 3613 (U.S. Feb. 22, 1983). As one court noted, it is
sometimes difficult to understand why a manufacturer would choose "a mark that
had long been employed ... and had become known to the trade instead of adopting
some other means to identify its goods ... unless there was a deliberate purpose to
obtain some advantage ... which [the trademark owner] had built up." Miles Shoes,
Inc. v. R.H. Macy & Co., 199 F.2d 602, 603 (2d Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S.
909 (1953); accord Spring Mills, Inc. v. Ultracashmere House, Ltd., 689 F.2d 1127,
1135 (2d Cir. 1982); American Chicle Co. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 208 F.2d
560, 562-63 (2d Cir. 1953).
69. S. Rep. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4, reprinted in 1946 U.S. Code
Cong. Serv. 1274, 1275; see Smith v. Chanel, Inc., 402 F.2d 562, 566 (9th Cir. 1968)
(use of trademarks promotes competition by enabling consumers to identify goods
that please them); see also Rogers, supra note 1, at 175 (Without trademarks, "[tjhere
would be competition, to be sure, but it would be competition to see who could make
the worst goods, not the best; and he would win whose product was the cheapest,
poorest, and most dishonest.").
70. S. Rep. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4, reprinted in 1946 U.S. Code
Cong. Serv. 1274, 1275.
71. Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena, 298 F. Supp. 1309, 1314
(S.D.N.Y. 1969), afJ'd, 433 F.2d 686 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 905
(1971). But see Borden, Inc. v. FTC, 674 F.2d 498, 512 (6th Cir. 1982) ("When a
seller possesses an overwhelmingly dominant share of the market, . . . and differenti-
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tors from using one particular term but does not prevent the competi-
tive production and sale of identical goods. 72 Except for the contested
term, a wealth of other words and phrases is available to competitors
to describe their goods to the public.73
Modern advertising techniques have greatly enhanced a manufac-
turer's ability to describe his product to the public.74 Recognition of
this fact is appropriate in light of the Act's objective of conforming
trademark law to "present-day" business practices. 75 Advertising that
involves visual representations, such as television, billboards, maga-
zine and newspaper ads, permits a manufacturer to reinforce the
description of the product with a picture of the goods. As a result, the
manufacturer is able to illustrate to the public the type of goods he is
attempting to sell, thus reducing a producer's need for a single term to
describe his product.
Comparative advertising also enhances a competitor's ability to
communicate with the public, providing a tool by which he can
educate consumers concerning the goods he is attempting to sell. 76 A
competitor may actually use the contested trademark in his advertis-
ing to clarify what he is selling.77 For example, the defendant's use of
the trademark "T.V. Guide" in a television commercial was found to
be acceptable comparative advertising. 78 The defendant used the
ates its product from others through a recognized and extensively advertised brand
name, thereby enabling the seller to control prices or unreasonably restrict competi-
tion, then monopoly power may be found to exist.").
72. Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena, 298 F. Supp. 1309, 1314
(S.D.N.Y. 1969), aff'd, 433 F.2d 686 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 905
(1971); see National Football League Properties, Inc., v. Wichita Falls Sportswear,
Inc., 532 F. Supp. 651, 663 (W.D. Wash. 1982) ("Plaintiffs do not seek to prohibit
the manufacture of jerseys, only jerseys which bear their marks. The jerseys are the
product and not the marks.").
73. R. Guastavino Co. v. Comerma, 184 F. 549, 550 (S.D.N.Y. 1911); accord
Aluminum Fabricating Co. v. Season-All Window Corp., 259 F.2d 314, 317 (2d Cir.
1958); Stork Restaurant, Inc. v. Sahati, 166 F.2d 348, 361 (9th Cir. 1948); Coca-
Cola Co. v. Old Dominion Beverage Corp., 271 F. 600, 604 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
256 U.S. 703 (1921); Formica Corp. v. Newnan Corp., 396 F.2d 486, 488 (C.C.P.A.
1968) (quoting Florence Mfg. Co. v. J.C. Dowd & Co., 178 F. 73, 75 (2d Cir. 1910).
-74. See Aluminum Fabricating Co. v. Season-All Window Corp., 259 F.2d 314,
317 (2d Cir. 1958) ("[T]he ingenuity of the public relations profession supplies new
words and slogans as they are needed.").
75. S. Rep. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in 1946 U.S. Code Cong.
Serv. 1274, 1276.
76. Seven-Up Co. v. No-Cal Corp., 191 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 202, 209 (E.D.N.Y.
1976); see Vuitton et Fils S.A. v. J. Young Enters., 644 F.2d 769, 776 (9th Cir. 1981);
Smith v. Chanel, Inc., 402 F.2d 562, 565 (9th Cir. 1968); Lee, Comparative Adver-
tising, Commercial Disparagement and False Advertising, 71 Trade-Mark Rep. 620,
621 (1981).
77. E.g., Vuitton et Fils S.A. v. J. Young Enters., 644 F.2d 769, 776 (9th Cir.
1981); Smith v. Chanel, Inc. 402 F.2d 562, 563-64 (9th Cir. 1968).
78. Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc., 445 F. Supp.
875, 877-78 (S.D. Fla. 1978), ajf'd, 626 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 1980).
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trademark to inform the public about the type of product it produced.
The commercial stated:
This is a T.V. Guide. When you buy it... that's all you get ....
This is the Miami Herald's T.V. Book. When you buy it .. .you
get ... extras.79
Using this kind of advertising, a manufacturer marketing a board
game similar or identical to "Monopoly" could develop an ad that
says: "Here is our new real estate trading board game. It's just like
Parker Brothers' game, 'Monopoly,' but ours is better because ...."
In evaluating a trademark's validity, considerable weight should be
given to the question of whether alternative terms exist that may be
used to describe goods similar to the trademarked product. In making
this evaluation, the competitors' enhanced ability to describe their
goods as a result of modern day marketing techniques and compara-
tive advertising should be taken into account.
B. Likelihood of Confusion
A major objective of the Act is to prevent public confusion concern-
ing the origin of goods. 80 Congress intended to regulate the use of
trademarks in such a manner that consumers could be confident that
when purchasing a trademarked product they would in fact get the
goods they intended to receive. 8' In determining whether a mark
should be deemed generic, an evaluation should be made as to
whether cancellation would result in confusion concerning the origin
of goods bearing the contested mark.12 One court noted that cancel-
lation should be granted only "[i]f the mark has come to be so public
and in such universal use that nobody can be deceived by the use of it,
and.. .[therefore induced] to believe that he is buying the goods of
the original trader. '8 3 In other words, cancellation should not be
79. Id. at 877 n.4.
80. S. Rep. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in 1946 U.S. Code Cong.
Serv. 1274, 1274.
81. Id. at 3, reprinted in 1946 U.S. Code Cong. Serv. 1274, 1274. Trademark
law attempts to "minimize confusion of the public as to the origin of the product and
to avoid diversion of customers misled by a similar mark." Scott Paper Co. v. Scott's
Liquid Gold, Inc., 589 F.2d 1225, 1228 (3d Cir. 1978); accord Nabisco Brands, Inc.
v. Quaker Oats Co., 547 F. Supp. 692, 698 (D.N.J. 1982); see Rogers, supra note 1,
at 176.
82. See Brooks Bros. v. Brooks Clothing, Ltd., 60 F. Supp 442, 453 (S.D. Cal.
1945) (The likelihood of confusion "is inherent in the use of the ... [contested mark]
by anyone but the plaintiff."), aff'd per curiam, 158 F.2d 798 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 331 U.S. 824 (1947).
83. DuPont Cellophane Co. v. Waxed Prods. Co., 85 F.2d 75, 82 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 299 U.S. 601 (1936) (quoting Ford v. Foster, 7 L.R.-Ch. 611, 628 (Ch. App.
1870)); see also L. Amdur, supra note 1, at 304 (same).
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granted if confusion is likely to result from an appreciable number of
buyers associating the contested mark with a single source and, after
cancellation, being unaware that the cancelled mark may be used by
other manufacturers.8 4
In trademark infringement cases, courts will act to prevent confu-
sion when "there is any likelihood that an appreciable number of
ordinarily prudent purchasers are likely to be misled or indeed simply
confused, as to the source of the goods in question." 85 When surveys
have indicated that as little as 11% to 25% of the public might be
deceived, courts have granted trademark protection to the relevant
term to avoid confusion. 6 Application of a similar standard is appro-
priate in cancellation proceedings because both trademark infringe-
ment and cancellation cases focus on whether the public perceives a
mark as indicating that goods derive from, or are associated with, a
particular source. 87 In a case in which a large percentage of the public
associates the contested term with the producer, such as the Anti-
Monopoly case,88 the likelihood of confusion becomes even more sig-
nificant. The best indicator of probable confusion is evidence showing
that there have been instances of actual confusion.8 9 Therefore, in a
84. See Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 412-13 (1916)("The
essence of the wrong consists in the sale of the goods of one manufacturer or vendor
for those of another."), quoted in Ideal Toy Corp. v. Plawner Toy Mfg. Corp., 685
F.2d 78, 84 (3d Cir. 1982); S.C. Johnson & Son v. Johnson, 116 F.2d 427, 429 (2d
Cir. 1940)("[T]he wrong involved is diverting trade from the first user by misleading
customers who mean to deal with him."); 3 R. Callmann, supra note 1, § 74.2, at 236
(a trademark should not be cancelled if "part of the public continues to associate the
mark with a particular ... source").
85. Mushroom Makers, Inc. v. R.G. Barry Corp., 580 F.2d 44, 47 (2d Cir. 1978)
(per curiam), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1116 (1979); accord Spring Mills, Inc. v.
Ultracashmere House, Ltd., 689 F.2d 1127, 1129 (2d Cir. 1982); McGregor-Doniger
Inc. v. Drizzle Inc., 599 F.2d 1126, 1130 (2d Cir. 1979); 3 R. Callmann, supra note
1, § 84, at 929.
86. Union Carbide Corp. v. Ever-Ready Inc., 531 F.2d 366, 385-86 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 830 (1976); e.g., Squirtco v. Seven-Up Co., 628 F.2d 1086,
1091 (8th Cir. 1980)(25%); James Burrough Ltd. v. Sign of Beefeater, Inc., 540 F.2d
266, 279 (7th Cir. 1976)(15%); Jockey Int'l, Inc. v. Burkard, 185 U.S.P.Q.(BNA)
201, 205 (S.D. Cal. 1975)(11.4%).
87. See, e.g., Coca-Cola Co. v. Overland Inc., 692 F.2d 1250, 1254 n.10 (9th
Cir. 1982) (cancellation case); Helene Curtis Indus. v. Church & Dwight Co., 560
F.2d 1325, 1332 (7th Cir. 1977)(same), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1070 (1978); James
Burrough Ltd. v. Sign of Beefeater, Inc., 540 F.2d 266, 275 (7th Cir. 1976)(trade-
mark infringement case); Union Carbide Corp. v. Ever-Ready Inc., 531 F.2d 366,
387 (7th Cir.)(same), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 830 (1976).
88. The survey accepted by the Ninth Circuit indicated that more than 55% of
the public associated the term "Monopoly" with a single source. Anti-Monopoly, Inc.
v. General Mills Fun Group, Inc., 684 F.2d 1316, 1322-23 (9th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 51 U.S.L.W. 3613 (U.S. Feb. 22, 1983).
89. Union Carbide Corp. v. Ever-Ready Inc., 531 F.2d 366, 383 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 830 (1976); Roto-Rooter Corp. v. O'Neal, 513 F.2d 44, 45-46 (5th
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cancellation proceeding, evidence of actual confusion is another factor
to be examined.
The competitive need to describe goods similar to the trademarked
goods must be balanced against the risk that a number of buyers who
know and use the term as a trademark will be deceived if other
manufacturers use that mark.90 If the possibility of confusion exists,
protection of consumers "must be given primary consideration.""1
C. Public Opinion Surveys
No generally accepted formula for determining public perception
by means of a survey has been established by the courts,92 even though
survey evidence is often employed in cases concerning public percep-
tion. 3 Conclusions regarding public understanding may vary dramat-
ically, depending upon the survey used.9 4 In a case pertaining to the
trademark "Teflon,"'95 for example, one survey indicated that 68 % of
the purchasers considered "Teflon" to be a brand name, 96 so that it
denoted source and was therefore a valid trademark. A different
Cir. 1975); Spangler Candy Co. v. Crystal Pure Candy Co., 353 F.2d 641, 643-44
(7th Cir. 1965); Standard Oil Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 252 F.2d 65, 74 (10th Cir.
1958).
90. American Thermos Prods. Co. v. Aladdin Indus., 207 F. Supp. 9, 27 (D.
Conn. 1962), af'd sub nom. King-Seeley Thermos Co. v. Aladdin Indus., 321 F.2d
577 (2d Cir. 1963); Marks v. Polaroid Corp., 129 F. Supp. 243, 270 (D. Mass. 1955),
aff'd, 237 F.2d 428 (1st Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 1005 (1957).
91. American Thermos Prods. Co. v. Aladdin Indus., 207 F. Supp. 9, 27 (D.
Conn. 1962), aff'd sub nom. King-Seeley Thermos Co. v. Aladdin Indus., 321 F.2d
577 (2d Cir. 1963); see Black Hills Jewelry Mfg. Co. v. LaBelle's, 489 F. Supp. 754,
756 (D.S.D.) ("Under the Lanham Act the interests of the public are supreme."),
afJ'd, 633 F.2d 746 (8th Cir. 1980).
92. Standard Oil Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 141 F. Supp. 876, 887 (D. Wyo.
1956), aff'd, 252 F.2d 65 (10th Cir. 1958); see American Thermos Prods. Co. v.
Aladdin Indus., 207 F. Supp. 9, 21 (D. Conn. 1962), aff'd sub nom. King-Seeley
Thermos Co. v. Aladdin Indus., 321 F.2d 577 (2d Cir. 1963).
93. See, e.g., Squirtco v. Seven-Up Co., 628 F.2d 1086, 1091 (8th Cir. 1980);
James Burrough Ltd. v. Sign of Beefeater, Inc., 540 F.2d 266, 277-79 (7th Cir.
1976); Union Carbide Corp. v. Ever-Ready Inc., 531 F.2d 366, 386 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 830 (1976); E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Yoshida Int'l, Inc.,
393 F. Supp. 502, 525-28 (E.D.N.Y. 1975); Jockey Int'l Inc. v. Burkard, 185
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 201, 205 (S.D. Cal. 1975); American Thermos Prods. Co. v. Alad-
din Indus., 207 F. Supp. 9, 20-22 (D. Conn. 1962), affd sub nom. King-Seeley
Thermos Co. v. Aladdin Indus., 321 F.2d 577 (2d Cir. 1963); In re Raytheon Co.,
202 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 317, 319-20 (Trademark Trial & App. Bd. 1979); see aLso 1 J.
McCarthy, supra note 1, § 12:2(G), at 410 ("Since the ultimate test of genericness is
customer usage, consumer survey evidence is relevant to the generic significance of a
term.").
94. See E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Yoshida Int'l, Inc., 393 F. Supp. 502,
525-27 (E.D.N.Y. 1975); N.Y. Times, Oct. 27, 1982, at Bi, col. 1.
95. E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Yoshida Int'l, Inc., 393 F. Supp. 502
(E.D.N.Y. 1975).
96. Id. at 526.
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survey, however, indicated that 86 % of the consumers considered it to
be the common descriptive term for a type of product, 97 which would
mean that the term was generic. Similarly, in Anti-Monopoly, the
surveys introduced by the parties also reached opposite conclusions
concerning public perception of the mark.98
One expert in the field of public opinion surveys has asserted that
different responses may be elicited simply by rearranging certain
questions in the survey. 99 Another polling expert has commented that
if five surveys were conducted, there would be five different results. 100
Given these inconsistencies,' 10 survey evidence should not be afforded
great weight, but rather it should be used only to corroborate evidence
presented by the other factors discussed in this Part.10 2
The Ninth Circuit, however, relied on a survey as compelling evi-
dence that the mark "Monopoly" had become generic. 0 3 In this sur-
vey, interviewers described a board game involving the buying, selling
and trading of real estate, in which the winner succeeded in bankrupt-
ing opponents. 0 4 Approximately 80% of the interviewees who were
familiar with the goods described said that if they were to buy such a
game they would ask for "Monopoly." 05 The court therefore held that
the term "Monopoly" was generic, based on the premise that the
public uses the name of the game to denote the game itself rather than
its producer. 06 A similar survey had been used in the case involving
the trademark "Teflon." 0 7 Yet, the Teflon court rejected the survey's
97. Id. at 525.
98. See Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. General Mills Fun Group, Inc., 684 F.2d 1316,
1321-24 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 51 U.S.L.W. 3613 (U.S. Feb. 22, 1983). Four
separate surveys were introduced as evidence: 1) the "Brand-name" survey; 2) the
"'Thermos" survey; 3) the "Motivation" survey; and 4) the "Tide" survey. Id. at 1323-
26.
99. N.Y. Times, Oct. 27, 1982, at B1, col. 5.
100. Id. at B5, cols. 3-4.
101. Surveys may not accurately reflect public perception because many individ-
uals "do not take the same trouble to avoid confusion when they are responding to
sociological investigators as when they spend their cash." American Footwear Corp.
v. General Footwear Co., 609 F.2d 655, 660-61 n.4 (2d Cir. 1979) (quoting Ameri-
can Luggage Works, Inc. v. United States Trunk Co., 158 F. Supp. 50, 53 (D. Mass.
1957)), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 951 (1980); accord Hawley Prods. Co. v. United States
Trunk Co., 259 F.2d 69, 78 (1st Cir. 1958); General Motors Corp. v. Cadillac
Marine & Boat Co., 226 F. Supp. 716, 737-38 (W.D. Mich. 1964).
102. See American Thermos Prods. Co. v. Aladdin Indus., 207 F. Supp. 9, 20-21
(D. Conn. 1962), aJf'd sub nom. King-Seeley Thermos Co. v. Aladdin Indus., 321
F.2d 577 (2d Cir. 1963); Monsieur Henri Wines, Ltd. v. Duran, 204 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
601, 606 (Trademark Trial & App. Bd. 1979).
103. Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. General Mills Fun Group, Inc., 684 F.2d 1316, 1323-
24 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 51 U.S.L.W. 3613 (U.S. Feb. 22, 1983).
104. Id. at 1323.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. See E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Yoshida Int'l, Inc., 393 F. Supp. 502,
525 (E.D.N.Y. 1975) ("Survey I").
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validity because the survey focused on obtaining the name that con-
sumers would use to ask for the goods described, without regard to
what they understood the name to mean.1 0 8
A trademark is often used by the public to identify both the product
and the producer. 10 9 As one court stated, a mark should not be
deemed "generic merely because it has some significance to the public
as an indication of the nature or class of an article .... [T]o become
generic the principle significance of the word must be its indication of
the nature or class of an article, rather than an indication of its
origin.""10 The public's understanding of a term as being indicative of
both product and producer was well illustrated in a case involving the
trademark "Dictaphone."' l Almost all of the non-expert witnesses
presented by the challenging party testified that the name "Dicta-
phone" was generally used to designate a type of product."12 This
would indicate that the term had become generic. Cross-examination
revealed, however, that although the witnesses used the name to refer
to a type of product, they knew that the term was in fact a trademark
for a specific manufacturer's goods. 11 3 The mark was therefore valid
because it was source indicative. The witnesses also stated that they
were aware of alternative descriptions for the relevant goods, such as
"dictating machines" or "dictation equipment."'' 14
That consumers request a product by the name given to the goods
by the manufacturer does not negate the mark's source-denoting func-
108. Id. at 527 (The dispositive issue is not what purchasers would ask for; rather
it is whether they recognize the term as a brand name or whether they view it solely
as a common descriptive term for a category of goods.); see Q-Tips, Inc. v. Johnson
& Johnson, 108 F. Supp. 845, 863 (D.N.J. 1952) ("Instances of use of the word ... in
a generic sense. . . do not of themselves necessarily establish that the buyers' under-
standing is that it is the name of a kind of goods sold."), aff'd, 206 F.2d 144 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 346 U.S. 867 (1953).
109. In re DC Comics, Inc., 689 F.2d 1042, 1054 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (Nies, J.,
specially concurring). Courts have recognized the dual function of a name. E.g., Life
Savers Corp. v. Curtiss Candy Co., 182 F.2d 4, 8 (7th Cir. 1950); Q-Tips, Inc. v.
Johnson & Johnson, 108 F. Supp. 845, 863 (D.N.J. 1952), aff'd, 206 F.2d 144 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 867 (1953); R. Guastavino Co. v. Comerma, 180 F. 920,
921 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1910).
110. Feathercombs, Inc. v. Solo Prods. Corp., 306 F.2d 251, 256 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 371 U.S. 910 (1962); accord Coca-Cola Co. v. Overland, Inc., 692 F.2d
1250, 1254 n.10 (9th Cir. 1982); Helene Curtis Indus. v. Church & Dwight Co., 560
F.2d 1325, 1332 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1070 (1978); 1 J. Gilson,
Trademark Protection & Practice, § 2.02(1), at 2-11 to 2-14 (1976).
111. Dictaphone Corp. v. Dictamatic Corp., 199 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 437 (D. Or.
1978).
112. Id. at 445.
113. Id.
114. Id.
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tion. 115 As described by one court, "[w]hen a person informs us that he
has bought a Ford, he need not add that it was an automobile. And
when he buys a Stetson, we know that he is buying a hat."" 6 The
name indicates both product and producer; therefore, a survey indica-
ting that the public would use a trademark to ask for certain goods
described to them is ambiguous. Such a survey fails to clarify the
primary significance of the name used." 7
In Anti-Monopoly, another survey-the "brand name" survey-
was conducted in which consumers were asked to classify various
words as either a common name for an item (the word "car" was
given as an example of a common name) or as a brand name (e.g.
"Chevrolet").118 The results indicated that 63% of the population
recognized the term "Monopoly" as a brand name.1"9 This survey
duplicated the method that had been accepted by the court in the
"Teflon" case.120 Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit rejected this survey
because a "brand name" was defined as a term indicating a product
made by one company.12 ' The court stated that "[u]nder the survey
definition, 'Monopoly' would have to be a 'brand name' because it is
made by only one company."' 2 2 Yet, this rationale presupposes that
the public is aware that only one company produces "Monopoly,"
which, if true, would show that the term is source indicative. In any
case, the definition used is appropriate because the purpose of a brand
name is to indicate to the public that the goods are made by a single
producer. 2 3
That a product is manufactured by only one company is irrelevant
in determining a mark's validity. 2 4 As stated by Judge Learned Hand,
115. In re DC Comics, Inc., 689. F.2d 1042, 1054 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (Nies, J.,
specially concurring) ("Such a given name is a proper name, like the name of an
individual, not a generic name, so long as the public uses it to identify a product of a
single source."); see Petition for Certiorari, CPG Prods. v. Anti-Monopoly, Inc., No.
82-1075 (U.S. Dec. 23, 1982), reprinted in 25 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA)
189, 189-90 (1983).
116. Brooks Bros. v. Brooks Clothing, Ltd., 60 F. Supp. 442, 454 (S.D. Cal.
1945), aJJ'd per curiam, 158 F.2d 798 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 824 (1947).
117. See King-Seeley Thermos Co. v. Aladdin Indus., 321 F.2d 577, 580 (2d Cir.
1963); E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Yoshida Int'l, Inc., 393 F. Supp. 502, 527
(E.D.N.Y. 1975).
118. Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. General Mills Fun Group, Inc., 684 F.2d 1316, 1323
(9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 51 U.S.L.W. 3613 (U.S. Feb. 22, 1983).
119. Id. at 1321.
120. See E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Yoshida Int'l, Inc., 393 F. Supp. 502,
527 (E.D.N.Y. 1975).
121. 684 F.2d at 1323.
122. Id.
123. See supra note 1.
124. In re DC Comics, Inc., 689 F.2d 1042, 1054 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (Nies, J.,
specially concurring).
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"all that is needed for a valid trade-mark is that the name should
indicate the manufacture of the owner, whether there are other man-
ufacturers or not."' 125
The "brand name" survey appears to present the most reliable
evidence concerning public perception because it addresses the essen-
tial question of a term's primary significance and the public's under-
standing of it. 126
In surveys used to ascertain public perception of a contested mark,
the trademarked goods should be shown to the interviewees, packaged
as the goods would normally be at the time of sale. 27 Asking questions
pertaining to trademarked goods that the interviewees can see better
reflects the reality of the marketplace than do questions posed in the
abstract. 12
D. Secondary Meaning
Another factor to be examined in a cancellation proceeding is
whether the challenged mark has acquired and retained a secondary
meaning. If the public associates the relevant trademarked goods with
a single source, the mark is said to have acquired a secondary mean-
ing. 129 Consequently, the term has become a brand name, and its
125. R. Guastavino Co. v. Comerma, 180 F. 920, 921 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1910).
126. E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Yoshida Int'l, Inc., 393 F. Supp. 502, 527
(E.D.N.Y. 1975)("[T]he public is quite good at sorting out brand names from com-
mon names.").
127. See, e.g., Amercian Footwear Corp. v. General Footwear Co., 609 F.2d 655,
660-61 n.4 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 951 (1980); James Burrough Ltd. v.
Sign of Beefeater, Inc., 540 F.2d 266, 277-78 (7th Cir. 1976); National Football
League Properties, Inc. v. Dallas Cap & Emblem Mfg. Inc., 26 Ill. App. 3d 820, 823,
327 N.E.2d 247, 250 (1975); see also Squirtco v. Seven-Up Co., 628 F.2d 1086, 1091
(8th Cir. 1980) (Likelihood of confusion "is based on an examination of the marks as
a whole, including visual impression."); In re Abcor Dev. Corp., 588 F.2d 811, 814
(C.C.P.A. 1978) ("Evidence of the context in which a mark is used on labels,
packages, or in advertising material directed to the goods is probative of the reaction
of prospective purchasers to the mark.").
128. A trademark should be examined in relation to normal buying conditions.
McGregor-Doniger Inc. v. Drizzle Inc., 599 F.2d 1126, 1137 (2d Cir. 1979); .see
Spring Mills, Inc. v. Ultracashmere House, Ltd., 689 F.2d 1127, 1133 (2d Cir. 1982);
Squirtco v. Seven-Up Co., 628 F.2d 1086, 1091 (8th Cir. 1980); Grotrian, Helfferich,
Schulz, Th. Steinweg Nechf. v. Steinway & Sons, 523 F.2d 1331, 1341-42 (2d Cir.
1975); Quaker Oats Co. v. General Mills, Inc., 134 F.2d 429, 433 (7th Cir. 1943);
Del Labs., Inc. v. Alleghany Pharmacal Corp., 516 F. Supp. 777, 782-83 (S.D.N.Y.
1981) (quoting 3 R. Callmann, supra note 1, § 82.2(c), at 807); In re Abcor Dev.
Corp., 588 F.2d 811, 814 (C.C.P.A. 1978).
129. Truck Equip. Serv. Co. v. Fruehauf Corp., 536 F.2d 1210, 1219 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 861 (1976); Union Carbide Corp. v. Ever-Ready Inc., 531
F.2d 366, 380 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 830 (1976); G. & C. Merriam Co. v.
Saalfield, 198 F. 369, 373 (6th Cir. 1912), af'd in part, 238 F. 1 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 243 U.S. 651 (1917); National Football League Properties, Inc. v. Wichita
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primary significance is necessarily source indicative.130 As such, the
mark should not be cancelled.
The Ninth Circuit, however, stated that a registered mark might be
invalid even if more than 50 % of the public associates the mark with
one producer. 131 The court incorrectly based its conclusion on Kellogg
Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 13 in which the Supreme Court held that
the term "shredded wheat" was generic even though many people
associated the product with a single manufacturer. 1 33 The doctrine of
secondary meaning could not be applied in that particular case134
because the contested mark had been used generically for many years
before the case was heard and moreover, had been denied trademark
registration based on a finding that the term was generic. 135
Courts have consistently held that if a term is originally generic,
and therefore part of the common vernacular prior to registration or
use, the term cannot acquire secondary meaning and thus be granted
trademark protection. 3 A registered mark, however, is presumed to
be non-generic 37 and may acquire secondary meaning. 38 In Anti-
Falls Sportswear, Inc., 532 F. Supp. 651, 658 (W.D. Wash. 1982); Black Hills
Jewelry Mfg. Co. v. LaBelle's, 489 F. Supp. 754, 756-57 (D.S.D.), aff'd, 633 F.2d
746 (8th Cir. 1980); 3 R. Callmann, supra note 1, § 77.2, at 346.
130. Union Carbide Corp. v. Ever-Ready Inc., 531 F.2d 366, 380 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 830 (1976); G. & C. Merriam Co. v. Saalfield, 198 F. 369, 373 (6th
Cir. 1912), aff'd in part, 238 F. 1 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 243 U.S. 651 (1917); see
Feathercombs, Inc. v. Solo Prods. Corp., 306 F.2d 251, 256 (2d Cir.) (a registered
mark becomes non-distinctive and generic when it loses its secondary meaning), cert.
denied, 371 U.S. 910 (1962); National Football League Properties, Inc. v. Wichita
Falls Sportswear, Inc., 532 F. Supp. 651, 663 (W.D. Wash. 1982) (contested mark
,was not generic based on proof of secondary meaning, and the likelihood that
confusion would result from use by a producer other than the trademark owner); 3
R. Callmann, supra note 1, § 74.2, at 236-37 (trademark should not be cancelled so
long as "part of the public continues to associate the mark with a particular, albeit
unknown, source").
131. Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. General Mills Fun Group, Inc., 684 F.2d 1316, 1322-
23 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 51 U.S.L.W. 3613 (U.S. Feb. 22, 1983).
132. 305 U.S. 111 (1938).
133. Id. at 118-19.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 116, 118.
136. E.g., Purolator, Inc. v. EFRA Distribs., Inc., 687 F.2d 554, 562 (1st Cir.
1982); Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir.
1976); J. Kohnstam, Ltd. v. Louis Marx & Co., 280 F.2d 437, 440 (C.C.P.A. 1960);
see 1 J. McCarthy, supra note 1, § 15:7, at 534 ("Once determined to be a generic
designation of a class of goods, no amount of evidence of purported secondary
meaning can give legal protection to that generic term.").
137. Vuitton et Fils S.A. v. J. Young Enters., 644 F.2d 769, 775-76 (9th Cir.
1981); Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 11 (2d Cir.
1976); Aluminum Fabricating Co. v. Season-All Window Corp., 259 F.2d 314, 317
(2d Cir. 1958); see 15 U.S.C. § 1115(a) (1976).
138. See McGregor-Doniger Inc. v. Drizzle Inc., 599 F.2d 1126, 1131-32 (2d Cir.
1979); Union Carbide Corp. v. Ever-Ready Inc., 531 F.2d 366, 380 (7th Cir.), cert.
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Monopoly, the Ninth Circuit failed to distinguish between terms origi-
nally generic and terms that have been granted registration, which are
therefore presumed to be valid. 139
E. Advertising and Sales
In cancellation proceedings, courts should also consider the amount
of time, money and energy expended by the trademark owner in
promoting his trademark, together with the volume of sales gener-
ated. 140 These factors are already consistently used to evaluate
whether a term has acquired a secondary meaning,14 ' based on public
perception. They are particularly valuable because no scientifically
accurate method of measuring public understanding exists.'4 2
In Anti-Monopoly, the district court gave weight to the fact that
Parker Brothers had made a substantial investment in the promotion
denied, 429 U.S. 830 (1976). If a term is generic before registration, it "already
belongs to the public." G. & C. Merriam Co. v. Saalfield, 198 F. 369, 373 (6th Cir.
1912), aff'd in part, 238 F. 1 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 243 U.S. 651 (1917). This
differs from a cancellation proceeding in which it must be determined that a word
which has been used exclusively by the trademark owner for some period of time has
become publici juri. See W.E. Bassett Co. v. Revlon, Inc., 435 F.2d 656, 661 (2d
Cir. 1970) (the "Shredded Wheat" case was distinguished because the term "shredded
wheat" was originally generic, whereas the contested term in Bassett was merely
descriptive, and therefore could acquire a secondary meaning). Similarly, in Truck
Equip. Serv. Co. v. Fruehauf Corp., 536 F.2d 1210 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
861 (1976), the court stated that the defendant was wrong in relying on the "Shred-
ded Wheat" case "for the proposition that . . . a particular name is incapable of
acquiring a secondary meaning even through long and exclusive use with a single
product," id. at 1219 n.12, which is the proposition upon which the Ninth Circuit
relied. The Eighth Circuit explained that on the facts of the "Shredded Wheat" case,
the doctrine of secondary meaning was inapplicable for policy reasons; " 'the courts
will never apply the "secondary meaning" doctrine so as to create monopoly rights.'"
Id. (quoting In re Deister Concentrator Co., 289 F.2d 496, 504 (C.C.P.A. 1961)).
139. See Petition for Certiorari, CPG Prods. v. Anti-Monopoly, Inc., No. 82-1075
(U.S. Dec. 23, 1982), reprinted in 25 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) 189, 189
(1983).
140. This consideration is consistent with the underlying objective of the Act to
protect a trademark owner who "has spent energy, time, and money" to promote his
trademarked goods. S. Rep. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in 1946 U.S.
Code Cong. Serv. 1274, 1274.
141. See, e.g., Ideal Toy Corp. v. Plawner Toy Mfg. Corp., 685 F.2d 78, 82 (3d
Cir. 1982); Faberge, Inc. v. Saxony Prods., Inc., 605 F.2d 426, 428 (9th Cir. 1979);
McGregor-Doniger Inc. v. Drizzle Inc., 599 F.2d 1126, 1133 n.4 (2d Cir. 1979);
Union Carbide Corp. v. Ever-Ready Inc., 531 F.2d 366, 380 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 830 (1976); Stix Prods., Inc. v. United Merchants & Mfrs., Inc., 295 F.
Supp. 479, 483 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); La Maur, Inc. v. Alberto-Culver Co., 179 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 607, 610 (D. Minn. 1973), aff'd per curiam, 496 F.2d 618 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 902 (1974); 3 R. Callmann, supra note 1, § 77.3, at 349.
142. See supra note 101.
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and policing of the "Monopoly" trademark. 4 3 On appeal, however,
the Ninth Circuit discounted these factors, stating that a trademark
owner's investment in a mark does not of itself create protectable
rights.1 44 The court based its reasoning on the premise that promotion
of a mark is irrelevant unless the trademark owner succeeds in con-
vincing consumers that the term is primarily source indicative. 145 This
premise, however, begins with the conclusion that such promotion has
failed to convince the public; in the initial determination of whether a
term is source indicative, the amount of expenditures is an important
factor to be considered.
Both advertising and the sale of the trademarked goods can have a
substantial impact on how the public perceives the mark. Both bring
the trademark to the consumers' attention and act as reminders that
the trademark is a brand name, 146 thereby educating the public to
recognize a term as the hallmark of a particular manufacturer. 147 A
large quantity of sales may indicate that purchasers are pleased with
the goods produced by that particular manufacturer and have thus
chosen to continue purchasing that brand of goods. 14 Consequently,
the source-denoting value of a mark may be greatly strengthened by a
trademark owner's expenditure of time, money and energy, and by a
large volume of sales. 149
Another case involving the "Monopoly" trademark, heard by the
Trademark Trial and Appeals Board'50 during the period of time that
the Anti-Monopoly case was being tried and appealed in the Ninth
Circuit, illustrates the importance of these factors. A subsequent user
of the term "Monopoly" was prohibited from registering it as a brand
name for wearing apparel because such use was likely to cause confu-
sion concerning the source of the goods. The Board accorded weight
143. Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. General Mills Fun Group, Inc., 515 F. Supp. 448,
454 (N.D. Cal. 1981), rev'd, 684 F.2d 1316 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 51
U.S.L.W. 3613 (U.S. Feb. 22, 1983).
144. Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. General Mills Fun Group, Inc., 684 F.2d 1316, 1322
(9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 51 U.S.L.W. 3613 (U.S. Feb. 22, 1983).
145. Id. at 1322-23 (citing HMH Publishing Co. v. Brincat, 504 F.2d 713, 719
(9th Cir. 1974)).
146. See Blisscraft of Hollywood v. United Plastics Co., 294 F.2d 694, 701-02 (2d
Cir. 1961).
147. See Telemed Corp. v. Tel-Med, Inc., 588 F.2d 213, 219 (7th Cir. 1978); E. I.
DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Yoshida Int'l, Inc., 393 F. Supp. 502, 512 (E.D.N.Y.
1975); 3 R. Callmann, supra note 1, § 82.1, at 756.
148. See Smith v. Chanel, Inc., 402 F.2d 562, 566-67 (9th Cir. 1968).
149. See Telemed Corp. v. Tel-Med, Inc., 588 F.2d 213, 219 (7th Cir. 1978);
Blisscraft of Hollywood v. United Plastics Co., 294 F.2d 694, 701 (2d Cir. 1961);
National Lead Co. v. Wolfe, 223 F.2d 195, 197 n.1 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 350 U.S.
883 (1955); Stork Restaurant, Inc. v. Sahati, 166 F.2d 348, 356 (9th Cir. 1948); Car-
Freshner Corp. v. Auto Aid Mfg. Corp., 201 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 233, 238 n.10
(N.D.N.Y. 1979).
150. General Mills Fun Group, Inc. v. Tuxedo Monopoly, Inc., 204 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 396 (Trademark Trial & App. Bd. 1979), aff'd, 648 F.2d 1335 (C.C.P.A.
1981).
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to the fact that Parker Brothers had used the term "Monopoly" for
over forty years, actively policing and promoting its use. 151 Recogniz-
ing that the manufacturer had sold more than 80 million "Monopoly"
game sets and had invested more than $5 million on advertising, 15 2 the
Board concluded that the game "enjoys an enormous popularity, and
the term 'MONOPOLY'. . . is the symbol of a widespread, pervasive,
and very favorable goodwill."' 5 3 Extensive advertising and steady
sales present circumstantial evidence 54 that a mark has acquired the
type of distinctiveness described by the Board. An inference may
therefore be drawn that the endeavors of the trademark owner have
resulted in a public awareness that the contested mark is a brand
name and source indicative. 55
F. Manner and Length of Use
The Senate hearings pertaining to the Act indicate that a mark
should not be cancelled solely because of the public's misuse of that
term; rather, cancellation should be granted only when misuse by the
public is coupled with misuse by the trademark owner. 155 By using a
generic term in conjunction with the use of the trademark to describe
the product, the owner may provide the public and other manufactur-
ers with an alternative method of describing the product and thereby
prevent public misuse. 157
151. Id. at 398-99.
152. Id. at 398.
153. Id. at 400. The Board commented that "Monopoly" "falls within that cate-
gory of marks known as 'famous' marks." Id.
154. Telemed Corp. v. Tel-Med, Inc., 588 F.2d 213, 219 (7th Cir. 1978);
Blisscraft of Hollywood v. United Plastics Co., 294 F.2d 694, 701-02 (2d Cir. 1961);
Dictaphone Corp. v. Dictamatic Corp., 199 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 437, 440-41 (D. Or.
1978); E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Yoshida Int'l, Inc., 393 F. Supp. 502, 512
(E.D.N.Y. 1975); Roux Labs., Inc. v. Clairol, Inc., 427 F.2d 823, 827-29 (C.C.P.A.
1970).
155. The steady promotion of a mark "impregnate[s] the atmosphere of the mar-
ket with the drawing power of a congenial symbol," Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen
Mfg. Co. v. S.S. Kresge Co., 316 U.S. 203, 205 (1942), so that it becomes "more
likely than not" that the trademark owner has succeeded in establishing a public
awareness of the source-denoting value of the contested mark. W. E. Bassett Co. v.
Revlon, Inc., 435 F.2d 656, 661 (2d Cir. 1970); see Kampgrounds v. North Del. A-
OK Campground, Inc., 415 F. Supp. 1288, 1293 (D. Del. 1976) (the contested mark
had become distinctive as a trademark through the promotional efforts maintained
by the trademark owner over a long period of time), af'd, 556 F.2d 566 (3d Cir.
1977).
156. D. Robert, supra note 16, at 34 ("[A] company that has a good trade-mark
and is making every effort to maintain its rights, should not lose the right because the
public wants to use that name." (quoting Senate hearings on H.R. 82, 78th Cong., 2d
Sess. 103)).
157. See E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Yoshida Int'l, Inc., 393 F. Supp. 502,
528 (E.D.N.Y. 1975); Stix Prods., Inc. v. United Merchants & Mfrs., Inc., 295 F.
Supp. 479, 482-83 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
(Vol. 51
1983] GENERICIDE: CANCELLING A TRADEMARK 689
In many instances, improper use of a trademark by its owner has
been responsible for the term's becoming generic. 58 The terms "aspi-
rin" 159 and "cellophane," 160 for example, were used generically by the
trademark owners to define the product being sold. The product
labels provided no indication that the terms were meant to denote
source, or were brand names. '6 ' The manufacturer of "Singer" sewing
machines also advertised his product as "Singers" without using the
generic designation, "sewing machines." 16 2 In each instance, generic
use of the term had become so widespread and pervasive that the
public knew of no other terms to describe the relevant goods. 6 3 In
addition, the trademark owners of "thermos" and "cellophane" acqui-
esced in the generic use of the terms by the public for an extended
period of time.16 4 Although both manufacturers subsequently at-
tempted to regenerate the value of their marks as source indicative,
the efforts made were too few and too late. 65 On the other hand, the
158. 3 R. Callmann, supra note 1, § 74.2, at 240-42; see, e.g., Singer Mfg. Co. v.
June Mfg. Co., 163 U.S. 169, 180 (1896); Donald F. Duncan, Inc. v. Royal Tops
Mfg. Co., 343 F.2d 655, 663 (7th Cir. 1965); DuPont Cellophane Co. v. Waxed
Prods. Co., 85 F.2d 75, 78-80 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 299 U.S. 601 (1936); Bayer Co.
v. United Drug Co., 272 F. 505, 510-12 (S.D.N.Y. 1921); Questor Corp. v. Dan
Robbins & Assocs., 199 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 358, 364 (Trademark Trial & App. Bd.
1978), aff'd, 599 F.2d 1009 (C.C.P.A. 1979).
Because the trademark owner is powerless to control the manner in which the
mark is used in dictionaries, journals and newspapers, cancellation based on evidence
of generic use in such publications has been criticized. See James Huggins & Sons v.
Avenarius Bros., 106 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 271, 272-73 (C.C.P.A. 1955); In re Bridge, 170
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 428, 430 (Trademark Trial & App. Bd. 1971); 1 J. McCarthy, supra
note 1, § 12:9, at 422-23. See generally Robb, Trademark Misuse in Dictionaries:
Inadequacy of Existing Legal Action and a Suggested Cure, 65 Marq. L. Rev. 179
(1981). Affording weight to dictionary usage has also been criticized because it
indicates the lexicographer's perception of the mark, but does not necessarily reflect
public understanding of the term. Surgicenters of Am., Inc. v. Medical Dental
Surgeries, Co., 601 F.2d 1011, 1021 (9th Cir. 1979) (Goodwin, J., dissenting); see
Blisscraft of Hollywood v. United Plastics Co., 294 F.2d 694, 699 (2d Cir. 1961).
159. Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co., 272 F. 505, 510-11 (S.D.N.Y. 1921).
160. DuPont Cellophane Co. v. Waxed Prods. Co., 85 F.2d 75, 78-80 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 299 U.S. 601 (1936).
161. Id.; Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co., 272 F. 505, 510-11 (S.D.N.Y. 1921).
162. Singer Mfg. Co. v. June Mfg. Co., 163 U.S. 169, 180-81 (1896).
163. Id. at 180; DuPont Cellophane Co. v. Waxed Prods. Co., 85 F.2d 75, 79-80
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 299 U.S. 601 (1936); Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co., 272 F.
505, 510 (S.D.N.Y. 1921); Q-Tips, Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson, 108 F. Supp. 845, 863
(D.N.J. 1952), af'd, 206 F.2d 144 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 867 (1953).
164. King-Seeley Thermos Co. v. Aladdin Indus., 321 F.2d 577, 578-79 (2d Cir.
1963); DuPont Cellophane Co. v. Waxed Prods. Co., 85 F.2d 75, 78-80 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 299 U.S. 601 (1936); see E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Yoshida
Int'l, Inc., 393 F. Supp. 502, 528 (E.D.N.Y. 1975); Stix Prods., Inc. v. United
Merchants & Mfrs., Inc., 295 F. Supp. 479, 483 n.11 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
165. King-Seeley Thermos Co. v. Aladdin Indus., 321 F.2d 577, 578-79 (2d Cir.
1963); DuPont Cellophane Co. v. Waxed Prods. Co., 85 F.2d 75, 78-80 (2d Cir.),
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trademark owner of "Teflon" had consistently used a generic term to
describe the trademarked goods whenever the trademark was used,
and for many years had fought misuse of the term by others.1l 6 One
court noted that the strength of a trademark is "an amorphous concept
with little shape or substance when divorced from the mark's commer-
cial context, including an appraisal of the owner's policing efforts to
ensure that whatever distinctiveness or exclusivity has been achieved is
not lost through neglect, inattention, or consent to infringing use." 6 7
The length of time for which a mark has been used is also important
in this respect. 16 A mark is strong if it is distinctive;169 it is distinctive
if consumers have been educated to recognize it as the symbol of a
particular source. 170 As one commentator has noted, "[iut seems to
follow as a necessary conclusion that the trade-mark has the advan-
tage of strength where its owner ...can point to a long period of
time during which his mark was used on a great quantity of articles,
as symbolic of his business."' 71 The Act itself recognizes the impor-
tance of the length of use by the trademark owner; it provides that
exclusive and continuous use of a mark for a period of five years is
prima facie evidence that the mark has acquired a secondary meaning
and is therefore source indicative. 172
Each of the factors discussed in Part II can be valuable in determin-
ing the validity of a trademark. Cancellation, however, should not be
based on a random analysis of miscellaneous factors, but rather should
be based on the weight of the evidence presented by a coherent group
of factors, applied in a consistent manner.
cert. denied, 299 U.S. 601 (1936); see E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Yoshida
Int'l, Inc., 393 F. Supp. 502, 528 (E.D.N.Y. 1975).
166. E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Yoshida Int'l, Inc., 393 F. Supp. 502, 528
(E.D.N.Y. 1975); see Dictaphone Corp. v. Dictamatic Corp., 199 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
437, 446 (D. Or. 1978) (court noted that the trademark owner had consistently taken
action to prevent misuse of the contested term).
167. E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Yoshida Int'l, Inc., 393 F. Supp. 502, 512
(E.D.N.Y. 1975).
168. See, e.g., Ideal Toy Corp. v. Plawner Toy Mfg. Corp., 685 F.2d 78, 82 (3d
Cir. 1982); Union Carbide Corp. v. Ever-Ready Inc., 531 F.2d 366, 380 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 830 (1976); La Maur, Inc. v. Alberto-Culver, Co., 179
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 607, 611 (D. Minn. 1973), aff'd per curiam, 496 F.2d 618 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 902 (1974); see also Massey Junior College, Inc. v. Fashion
Inst. of Tech., 492 F.2d 1399, 1402 (C.C.P.A. 1974) (the longer a trademark has
been used, "the greater may be the number of facts ... to be considered in determin-
ing the quantum of proof required").
169. Telemed Corp. v. Tel-Med, Inc., 588 F.2d 213, 219 (7th Cir. 1978); James
Burrough Ltd. v. Sign of Beefeater, Inc., 540 F.2d 266, 276 (7th Cir. 1976); Dicta-
phone Corp. v. Dictamatic Corp., 199 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 437, 440 (D. Or. 1978); E. I.
DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Yoshida Int'l, Inc., 393 F. Supp. 502, 512 (E.D.N.Y.
1975); see Blisscraft of Hollywood v. United Plastics Co., 294 F.2d 694, 701-02 (2d
Cir. 1961).
170. Telemed Corp. v. Tel-Med, Inc., 588 F.2d 213, 219 (7th Cir. 1978).
171. 3 R. Callmann, supra note 1, § 82.1, at 756, quoted in Telemed Corp. v. Tel-
Med, Inc., 588 F.2d 213, 219 (7th Cir. 1978).
172. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f) (1976).
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III. THE APPROPRIATE BURDEN OF PROOF
In determining how the public perceives a contested trademark, the
point at which sufficient evidence has been presented to prove that the
contested mark has become generic is unclear. 173 Although the factors
to be considered permit the court to give weight to both the need of
competitors to describe their products 174 and the consumers' need to
be protected against confusion concerning source, 75 the factors enu-
merated afford very little opportunity to weigh the interests of the
trademark owner. In light of the Lanham Act's basic objective of
protecting both the goodwill the owner has developed and his invest-
ment in the trademark,176 weight should be given to the harm that
cancellation may cause the trademark owner. 7 His interests, there-
fore, should be an important element in selecting the proper burden of
proof.
A registered trademark often has substantial value to the trademark
owner;178 it may actually be a company's most valuable asset,17 con-
173. See Dictaphone Corp. v. Dictamatic Corp., 199 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 437, 445
(D. Or. 1978); Roux Labs., Inc. v. Clairol Inc., 427 F.2d 823, 829 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
174. See supra pt. II(A).
175. See supra pt. II(B).
176. S. Rep. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, 5, reprinted in 1946 U.S. Code
Cong. Serv. 1274, 1274, 1276; see Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S.
403, 412 (1916) ("The redress that is accorded in trade-mark cases in based upon the
party's right to be protected in the good-will of a trade or business."); Massey Junior
College, Inc. v. Fashion Inst. of Tech., 492 F.2d 1399, 1403 (C.C.P.A. 1974) ("The
problem of achieving [the] legislative purpose of the Act becomes apparent from the
variable factors which can be present in [a] . . . cancellation proceeding: degree of
likelihood of confusion, relative length of time of use of a mark, and relative invest-
ment in good will by the parties."). The addition of § 1064(c), providing for cancel-
lation of a registered mark, does not appear to have altered the underlying goals of
the Act. Union Carbide Corp. v. Ever-Ready Inc., 531 F.2d 366, 375-76 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 830 (1976) (citing D. Robert, supra note 16, at 138).
177. See American Footwear Corp. v. General Footwear Co., 609 F.2d 655, 664
(2d Cir. 1979) (the equities involved must be weighed, trademark infringement case),
cert. denied, 445 U.S. 951 (1980); Mushroom Makers, Inc. v. R.G. Barry Corp., 580
F.2d 44, 49 (2d Cir. 1978) (per curiam), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1116 (1979); Chan-
don Champagne Corp. v. San Marino Wine Corp., 335 F.2d 531, 534 (2d Cir. 1964);
United States Jaycees v. San Francisco Junior Chamber of Commerce, 354 F. Supp.
61, 78 (N.D. Cal. 1972), aff'd per curiam, 513 F.2d 1226 (9th Cir. 1975); see also 3
R. Callmann, supra note 1, § 74.3(c), at 252 ("It appears highly inequitable to
deprive a pioneer of the very substantial value in the goodwill of his trademark,
which took time and money to establish.").
178. Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S.S. Kresge Co., 316 U.S. 203,
205 (1942); Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 412 (1916), quoted in
Ideal Toy Corp. v. Plawner Toy Mfg. Corp., 685 F.2d 78, 84 (3d Cir. 1982); W.D.
Byron & Sons, Inc. v. Stein Bros. Mfg. Co., 377 F.2d 1001, 1003 (C.C.P.A. 1967).
Assets involving millions of dollars are often at stake. See, e.g., Stix Prods., Inc. v.
United Merchants & Mfrs., Inc., 295 F. Supp. 479, 483 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (trademark
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stituting the cornerstone upon which a successful business has been
built. Cancellation might well be destructive to such a business,l s°
causing a loss of patrons and damage to the trademark owner's repu-
tation.18' If members of the public continue to associate the term with
the trademark owner, cancellation of the mark may damage his repu-
tation because work bearing that mark will be attributed to him.1 2
Customers may be so dissatisfied with the product they have pur-
chased that they will not buy that product again or any other product
that they believe comes from the original trademark owner. 8 3
One court concluded that both the Act and "fair competition [re-
quire] that those who invest time, money and energy into the develop-
ment of goodwill and a favorable reputation be allowed to reap the
advantages of their investment."' ' 4 In a case involving the well-
known trademark "Coke," 8 5 the Supreme Court recognized and gave
weight to the tremendous goodwill that the producer had developed
in his trademark. Writing for the Court, Justice Holmes observed that
the trademark had acquired a meaning "in which perhaps the product
is more emphasized than the producer but to which the producer is
entitled." 8 6
Registration of a mark creates a strong presumption of validity, 817
and "[t]he general presumption of validity resulting from federal
registration includes the specific presumption that the trademark is
for goods with sales of $90 million over a fifteen-year period); Questor Corp. v. Dan
Robbins & Assocs., 199 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 358, 362 (Trademark Trial & App. Bd.
1978) (sales of approximately $14 million over a six-year period), aff'd, 599 F.2d 1009
(C.C.P.A. 1979).
179. Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S.S. Kresge Co., 316 U.S. 203,
205 (1942); In re DC Comics, Inc., 689 F.2d 1042, 1053 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (Nies, J.,
specially concurring).
180. In re Myers, 201 F.2d 379, 383-84 (C.C.P.A. 1953); see Questor Corp. v.
Dan Robbins & Assocs., 199 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 358, 364 (Trademark Trial & App. Bd.
1978), aff'd, 599 F.2d 1009 (C.C.P.A. 1979).
181. See Vitarroz Corp. v. Borden, Inc., 644 F.2d 960, 967 (2d Cir. 1981); Smith
v. Chanel, Inc., 402 F.2d 562, 566 n.13 (9th Cir. 1968).
182. Stork Restaurant, Inc. v. Sahati, 166 F.2d 348, 356-57 (9th Cir. 1948); see
Vitarroz Corp. v. Borden, Inc., 644 F.2d 960, 967 (2d Cir. 1981); Maier Brewing
Co. v. Fleishmann Distilling Corp., 390 F.2d 117, 122 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 391
U.S. 966 (1968).
183. Maier Brewing Co. v. Fleischmann Distilling Corp., 390 F.2d 117, 122 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 966 (1968).
184. Truck Equip. Serv. Co. v. Fruehauf Corp., 536 F.2d 1210, 1215 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 861 (1976); see Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 102 S.
Ct. 2182, 2188 n.14 (1982) ("Applying a trademark to goods produced by one other
than the trademarks's owner ... deprives the owner of the good will which he spent
energy, time and money to obtain." (trademark infringement case)).
185. Coca-Cola Co. v. Koke Co., 254 U.S. 143 (1920).
186. Id. at 146.
187. See supra note 4.
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not generic."" 8 In a cancellation proceeding, therefore, the burden of
proof rests on the challenging party, 8" and sufficient evidence must be
presented to overcome the presumption of validity.
In Anti-Monopoly, the district court ruled that "convincing evi-
dence" was needed to overcome the presumption of validity. 190 Yet,
the appellate court ruled that the presumption could be overcome by a
"preponderance of the evidence," '91 a lighter burden. To be consistent
with the Act's objective of protecting a trademark owner's investment,
188. Coca-Cola Co. v. Overland, Inc., 692 F.2d 1250, 1254 (9th Cir. 1982); Reese
Publishing Co. v. Hampton Int'l Communications, Inc., 620 F.2d 7, 11 (2d Cir.
1980); McGregor-Doniger Inc. v. Drizzle Inc., 599 F.2d 1126, 1132 (2d Cir. 1979);
Miss Universe, Inc. v. Patricelli, 408 F.2d 506, 509 (2d Cir. 1969).
189. Vuitton et Fils S.A. v. J. Young Enters., 644 F.2d 769, 775-76 (9th Cir.
1981); Surgicenters of Am., Inc. v. Medical Dental Surgeries, Co., 601 F.2d 1011,
1020-21 (9th Cir. 1979) (Goodwin, J., dissenting); Miss Universe, Inc. v. Miss Teen
U.S.A., Inc., 209 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 698, 704 (N.D. Ga. 1980); E. I. DuPont de
Nemours & Co. v. Yoshida Int'l, Inc., 393 F. Supp. 502, 523 (E.D.N.Y. 1975);
American Thermos Prods. Co. v. Aladdin Indus., 207 F. Supp. 9, 14 (D. Conn.
1962), aff'd sub nom. King-Seeley Thermos Co. v. Aladdin Indus., 321 F.2d 577 (2d
Cir. 1963); James Huggins & Son, Inc. v. Avenarius Bros., 223 F.2d 494, 497
(C.C.P.A. 1955); 3 R. Callman, supra note 1, § 74.2, at 244 ("[I]t is the defendant's
burden to prove that the . . .trademark has passed into public domain. This is a
heavy burden to sustain."). In Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. General Mills Fun Group,
Inc., 515 F. Supp. 448 (N.D. Cal. 1981), rev'd, 684 F.2d 1316 (9th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 51 U.S.L.W. 3613 (U.S. Feb. 22, 1983), the district court properly placed
the burden of proof on the challenging party. The court concluded that the presump-
tion of validity had not been overcome: "This court cannot say from the facts before
it that [source attribution] is not the 'primary significance' of the mark." Id. at 455.
The appellate court, on the other hand, concluded that even though the evidence
showed that 55% of the public associated "Monopoly" with the producer, the term
was generic. 684 F.2d at 1322-23. The appellate court thereby shifted the burden of
proof from the challenging party to the trademark owner. In Dan Robbins & Assocs.
v. Questor Corp., 599 F.2d 1009 (C.C.P.A. 1979), the court pointed out that the
challenging party had erroneously attempted to shift the burden of proof onto the
trademark owner. Id. at 1015.
190. Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. General Mills Fun Group, Inc., 515 F. Supp. 448,
451-52 (N.D. Cal. 1981), rev'd, 684 F.2d 1316 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 51
U.S.L.W. 3613 (U.S. Feb. 22, 1983).
191. Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. General Mills Fun Group, Inc., 684 F.2d 1316, 1319
(9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 51 U.S.L.W. 3613 (U.S. Feb. 22, 1983). For a discus-
sion of the phrase "preponderance of the evidence," see Spaulding Bakeries Inc. v.
Interstate Brands Corp., 209 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 355, 356-57 (Trademark Trial & App.
Bd. 1980).
The Ninth Circuit based its ruling on Vuitton et Fils S.A. v. J. Young Enters., 644
F.2d 769, 775-76 (9th Cir. 1981), without discussing the rationale for imposing the
lighter burden of proof. The Vuitton case also offered no rationale, relying on Massey
Junior College, Inc. v. Fashion Inst. of Tech., 492 F.2d 1399 (C.C.P.A. 1974). 644
F.2d at 775-76. In Massey, the court merely stated that "a preponderance of evidence
will usually be 'sufficient' " to prove that a defendant's mark is so similar to the
trademark owner's symbol that a likelihood of confusion exists. 492 F.2d at 1403. The
court does not discuss what burden of proof must be met to cancel a mark on the
grounds of genericness, nor does it address the question of whether a heavy burden or
a light one is preferable.
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a heavy burden of proof'0 2 should be applied. A trademark owner can
be afforded substantial protection by requiring the challenging party
to show that to the "public as a whole" the contested mark has "lost all
its trademark significance." 193 Similarly, it has been held that cancel-
lation should be denied unless the challenging party can show that
misuse of the contested term has become "so widespread and of such
duration that there can be no doubt that to the ... public generally
the mark identifies the article as to kind rather than as to source." 1 94
Other courts have required that the evidence be "clear and convinc-
ing" 195 or "conclusive."'' 96 Any of these standards are appropriate
because they further the objectives of the Act by protecting registered
trademarks and protecting the owners' investments therein. 9 7
When doubts exist concerning the primary significance of the con-
tested term, an additional measure of protection may be afforded the
trademark owner by resolving such doubts in favor of the trademark's
validity. 98 When evidence leaves unresolved doubts in a trademark
infringement case, those doubts are resolved in favor of the trademark
owner. 199 Application of this standard in cancellation proceedings is
192. See, e.g., Surgicenters of Am., Inc. v. Medical Dental Surgeries, Co., 601
F.2d 1011, 1021 (9th Cir. 1979) (Goodwin, J., dissenting); E. I. DuPont de Nemours
& Co. v. Yoshida Int'l, Inc., 393 F. Supp. 502, 523-24 (E.D.N.Y. 1975); Thomas
Pride Mills, Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 155 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 205, 208 (N.D. Ga. 1967).
193. Marks v. Polaroid Corp., 129 F. Supp. 243, 270 (D. Mass. 1955), aff'd, 237
F.2d 428 (1st Cir. 1956) (emphasis in original), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 1005 (1957);
accord Maremont Corp. v. Air Lift Co., 463 F.2d 1114, 1118 (C.C.P.A. 1972).
194. Formica Corp. v. Newnan Corp., 149 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 585, 587 (Trademark
Trial & App. Bd. 1966), rev'd on other grounds, 396 F.2d 486 (C.C.P.A. 1968); see
DuPont Cellophane Co. v. Waxed Prods, Co., 85 F.2d 75, 82 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
299 U.S. 601 (1936); L. Amdur, supra note 1, at 304.
195. E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Yoshida Int'l, Inc., 393 F. Supp. 502, 528
(E.D.N.Y. 1975).
196. Thomas Pride Mills, Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 155 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 205, 208
(N.D. Ga. 1967); James Huggins & Son, Inc. v. Avenarius Bros., 97 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
474, 476 (Examiner in Chief 1953), aff'd, 223 F.2d 494 (C.C.P.A. 1955); 3 R.
Callmann, supra note 1, § 74.2, at 244; see Singer Mfg. Co. v. June Mfg. Co., 163
U.S. 169, 180 (1896).
197. S. Rep. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in 1946 U.S. Code Cong.
Serv. 1274, 1274.
198. Surgicenters of Am., Inc. v. Medical Dental Surgeries, Co., 601 F.2d 1011,
1021 (9th Cir. 1979) (Goodwin, J., dissenting); E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v.
Yoshida Int'l, Inc., 393 F. Supp. 502, 523-24 (E.D.N.Y. 1975); Massey Junior
College, Inc. v. Fashion Inst. of Tech., 492 F.2d 1399, 1403 n.7 (C.C.P.A. 1974);
Fricks' Foods, Inc. v. Mar-Gold Corp., 417 F.2d 1078, 1080 (C.C.P.A. 1969); 3 R.
Callmann, supra note 1, § 74.2, at 236.
199. See, e.g., San Fernando Elec. Mfg. Co. v. J.F.D. Elecs. Components Corp.,
565 F.2d 683, 684 (C.C.P.A. 1977); Formica Corp. v. Newnan Corp., 396 F.2d 486,
488 (C.C.P.A. 1968); General Mills Fun Group, Inc. v. Tuxedo Monopoly, Inc., 204
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 396, 401 (Trademark Trial & App. Bd. 1979), aff'd, 648 F.2d 1335
(C.C.P.A. 1981).
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appropriate because it would be irreconcilable to interpret the Act as
requiring vigilance in preventing trademark infringement, while at
the same time interpreting it to require a lenient standard for cancel-
lation of a mark. Such a standard is also appropriate because consider-
ation must be given to the likelihood that cancelling a mark will cause
confusion for those consumers who know the term as a brand name.
The interests of the trademark owner can best be protected by impos-
ing a heavy burden of proof on the challenging party, and resolving
doubts in favor of validity.
CONCLUSION
Public understanding is the key for determining whether a regis-
tered trademark has lost its source-denoting value and become ge-
neric. To evaluate public perception, a broad set of factors should be
examined as a whole, including the availability of alternative terms,
the likelihood that cancellation will cause confusion concerning
source, and the trademark owner's use and promotion of the contested
term. A heavy burden of proof should be imposed on the challenging
party and any remaining doubts should be resolved in favor of the
term's validity in order to further the basic Lanham Act objective of
protecting the trademark owner. Such guidelines will create a bal-
anced method of evaluating a mark's validity and will result in con-
sistent and equitable decisions in cancellation proceedings.
Jacqueline Stern
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